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THE AMBIVALENT ROLE OF ITALIAN PROSECUTORS AND THEIR 
RESISTANCE TO 'MORAL PANICS' ABOUT CRIME 




The following study is intended to illustrate the value of empirically 
informed approaches to comparative criminal justice -requiring close 
analysis of rules, roles and procedures- as a way of throwing light on 
central criminological topics (Nelken, 2000, 2010a). The issue considered 
here has to do with the rise of 'punitiveness' internationally and the part 
played by criminal justice actors in this process. On the basis of empirical 
research in Italy this chapter shall be focusing on the role of prosecutors in 
responding to political and public calls for more severity against crimes by 
illegal immigrants. After first providing a historical and theoretical context 
for our research we shall analyze the ambivalent role of Italian prosecutors 
and then go on to explain how this affects the part they play in the way the 




Like many other countries, Italy is facing the problems of risk and 
insecurity that late modernity brings in its wake. In Italy public discussion 
of these problems emerged later than in some other Western countries (in 
the second half of the nineties). This is seen, for example, in the fact that 
until quite recently, everyday crime in Italy was referred to as 'micro- 
criminality'- thus distinguishing it from the objectively greater threats to the 
state posed by terrorism, organized crime and political corruption. 
Although these major problems have by no means disappeared, worries 
about security reported in the media are increasingly linked to illegal 
immigration (or even immigration as such). Illegal immigrants are said to 
be disproportionately involved in so called street or diffuse crimes such as 
mugging, drug pushing and burglary.  
 
The center-right and the center-left political coalitions propose different 
solutions to these crime problems. The former are more focused on 
repression, the latter point more to the underlying social conditions that 
create social conflicts. But even the mass media that are ideologically on 
the center-left, and normally criticize law and order campaigns, do 
acknowledge that there is an issue of crime and security, and center-left 
administrations use rhetoric that is increasingly indistinguishable from their 
political opponents. Public opinion surveys also suggest high rates of 
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public concern.1 In addition, citizen committees have been elected in the 
districts of many cities and towns so as to report and discuss problems 
concerning crime and deviance within their areas. Their efforts are not 
only directed against specific crime problems, but incivilities, deviance, 
immigration, and disorder in general appear to be crucial issues as well.  
 
All this means that there is the potential in Italy as elsewhere for an 
explosion in prison numbers. And, in fact, the number of immigrants in 
prison has gone up exponentially since they started arriving in the 1990's 
(and this does not include those being held in special prisons  that until 
recently were called places of temporary permanence). This is because 
illegal or irregular immigrants now provide the workforce for crimes such 
as  drug pushing that, if associated with recidivism, are often punished 
with a custodial sentence. However, despite legislative measures that are 
clearly designed to tackle street crime and illegal immigration, overall 
numbers in prison in Italy (around 100 per 100,000 of the population) 
remain within the average range of what leading comparative penologists 
have dubbed the 'Continental Corporatist' societies (Cavadino & Dignan, 
2006). By comparison 'neo-liberal' societies such as the U.S.A. (700 per 





Southern European countries generally have higher rates of immigrants in 
prison than do neo- liberal societies (Solevitti 2010). What needs to be 
understood is why numbers in prison have not risen even higher in places 
such as Italy. For many authors (e.g. Cavadino & Dignan, 2006; Waquant, 
2009, 2010a, and, with more nuance, Lacey, 2008) differences in the 
organization of politics and the economy are the crucial explanatory 
variables. However, this ignores a crucial intermediate variable that affects 
how many people actually end up in prison - the operation of the criminal 
justice system. This requires giving close attention to the roles of legal 
actors, such as prosecutors, and the types of criminal procedure that 
shapes their roles (Nelken, 2009, 2010).  
 
The significance of differences in the role of prosecutors in continental and 
common law systems was at the center of the classical debate in 
comparative criminal procedure between Goldstein and Marcus (1977) 
and Langbein and Weinreb (1978). But this concerned the extent to which 
prosecutors and judges in France, Germany and Italy really exercised 
control over how police conducted their investigations. However, the 
parties to the controversy may have been largely speaking past each 
other. If the question was how Continental methods of control over the 
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police would work in the U.S.A., then Goldstein and Marcus were right that 
such methods would be insufficient to avoid potential misbehavior by the 
police. But, insofar as the issue was trying to understand what other 
places were actually trying to do -and sometimes succeeding in doing- in 
the context of their own structures and expectations, then Langbein and 
Weinreb had the better of the argument. 
 
The research presented here has to do with trying to characterize these 
(changing) structures and expectations as they currently apply to 
prosecutors in Italy. But the issue addressed is not the traditional one, 
their role in supervising the police. Rather it is the less discussed question 
of whether, when, where, why and how prosecutors in continental legal 
systems exercise their powers so as to blunt trends towards increasing 
punitiveness of the weak and marginal sectors of the society. Taking 
Italian prosecutors as a case-study is particularly interesting and 
instructive for this purpose as for the past twenty years their status is 
supposed to have been made more like that of prosecutors in the common 
law world. The findings come from 54 semi-structured interviews that were 
conducted between April and October 2006.2 Five consultants, two 
prosecutors, one police officer and two lawyers were first interviewed as 
informants. Then, the actual interviews were carried out with 27 
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prosecutors, 11 police officers and 11 lawyers. These interviews were 
conducted in 10 prosecution offices (and with lawyers and police officers 
working in the same area) of various sizes located mainly in the north, but 
also in the center and in the south of Italy.  
 
THE AMBIVALENT ROLE OF PROSECUTORS IN ITALY 
 
The 1989 reform of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure famously 
sought to reshape a mainly inquisitorial into an accusatorial system.3 The 
trial stage became central to the determination of guilt, and defense 
lawyers saw their role increased and were given the power to gather their 
own evidence. Most important for our purposes, the reform also changed 
the prosecutors’ institutional role from being quasi- judicial figures to state 
accusers. In practice, however, the Italian criminal justice system is still in 
many respects embedded in the continental inquisitorial tradition. For 
example, judges have the power to request further investigation basically 
at every stage of the criminal process. Constitutional Court decisions (in a 
context in which organized crime made it dangerous for witnesses to rely 
only on evidence that comes out in trial) and various legislative reforms 




In many Italian textbooks the traditional interpretation that depicts 
prosecutors as responsible for the correct application of the law as neutral 
quasi-judicial figures is still well entrenched. And it is crucial too that, 
institutionally and organizationally, judges and prosecutors are both part of 
the judiciary. They share the same career path and can- subject to certain 
conditions- switch functions as their careers develop. Prosecutors, like 
judges, are also fully independent of any other constitutional powers 
including the government. They are subject to the legality principle- the 
obligation to prosecute where evidence is available is a constitutional 
principle that cannot be compromised even for supposed reasons of 
'public interest'.  
 
But, after the 1989 reform reconfigured the role of prosecutors as 
responsible for constructing a case that will stand scrutiny at trial, the 
continued accuracy and validity of this traditional inquisitorial model of the 
quasi-judicial role for prosecutors has been widely criticized both by 
academic commentators and - for their own reasons- by politicians. 
Prosecutors have been accused many times over the last twenty years- 
often misleadingly- of going out of their way to use their powers to attack 
members of some political parties, as well as Premier Berlusconi. 
However, in a country like Italy, where there is considerable suspicion of 
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political corruption it has so far not been possible for politicians to deny 
that placing prosecutors under government control would lead to (even 
greater) abuse of their powers. 
 
At the very least it can be said that prosecutors now occupy an especially 
ambivalent role, still possessing many of the attributes of quasi- judicial 
actors searching for the truth whilst being inserted in a new legal 
architecture intended to cast them on one side of a contest  over the guilt 
of the accused. Surprisingly, there has been little research into this 
ambivalence. The only large scale empirical study of prosecutors in Italy is 
that conducted by Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002). But their concern - 
part of a larger agenda that considered judges and prosecutors too willing 
to interfere in politics - was that prosecutors did not in practice respect the 
legality principle and that obligatory prosecution was in practice no more 
than a myth. In their views prosecutors can and do choose, sometimes on 
politically influenced criteria, which matters to prosecute. Thus they see 
prosecutors as effective crime fighters - targeting politically relevant cases. 
Our study, which focuses more on their de-prioritizing of a large number of 
normal cases, also shows that prosecutors have their own priorities about 
what gets dealt with as crime. But we see this not so much as a matter of 
them exercising political preferences and more as a result of them 
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continuing to see their role in a traditional way. Even though prosecutors 
cannot formally decide which cases deserve to be prosecuted in a regime 
where prosecution is obligatory, choosing which cases to handle first is an 
indirect way of achieving the same result because after a certain point the 
case becomes time- bound - what  Italians describe as 'prescrizione’4 
(Nelken & Zanier, 2006). 
 
It could be said that, in general, all prosecutors occupy an ambivalent 
position with respect to the different value systems that compete in 
criminal justice systems, as set out in Packer's famous distinction between 
crime control and due process (Packer, 1968). Administrative fact-finding 
serves the aims of crime control values. So, repression of criminal conduct 
is the most important function performed by the criminal process. As a 
consequence, this must be efficient and facts must be established as 
quickly as possible with routine procedures which do not rely on a formal 
process of examination. Adjudicative fact-finding, by contrast, is more 
linked to due process values. Almost all criminal justice systems have 
features that belong to both of these models, although the mix of the 
elements varies. What makes the Italian case special, however, is the 
superimposition of a model with a mix more favorable to crime control 
values over a previous one with, formally speaking, much more bias 
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towards due process values- and the way these two models continue to 
co- exist.  
 
For Italian prosecutors, this superimposition heightens their ambivalent 
status between the role of crime fighters and judicial figures. Whereas 
crime fighters are clearly linked with the concept of crime control related to 
efficiency, high rate of conviction, and administrative fact-finding model, 
the judicial task is related to the concept of due process involving legal 
controls, the primacy of the individual, adjudicative fact-finding model and 
so on. When asked about their views, a large majority of the Italian 
prosecutors interviewed insisted that their professional values have 
nothing in common with that of the crime fighter. Twenty-two prosecutors 
said that they did not act like crime fighters. One did not answer clearly. 
Four said that they did act like crime fighters. They explained that they 
looked for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence so as to establish the 
legal and factual truth while, in their opinion, crime fighters search only for 
a conviction. By contrast, they share the same professional culture as 





Functionally it is clear that there are important differences in the tasks of 
prosecutors and judges in Italy. When prosecutors receive a report, they 
have to determine if a crime has been committed and if the evidence 
collected is capable to stand scrutiny at trial. This phase continues during 
the investigation when more evidence is collected by the police and 
prosecutors directly and it terminates when prosecutors decide to refer the 
case to trial or to drop the file. As with all prosecutors, they have to filter 
out  reports that do not actually include a crime as defined by the law, and 
evidence that has not been legally obtained and 'predict' whether there is 
a ‘realistic likelihood’ of conviction. Such legal filtering then enables judges 
to make decisions on legally relevant evidence. This means that they deal 
with cases before judges do, have direct contact with the police and have 
to build up a case that will be then presented at trial. Unlike judges, 
prosecutors are inevitably influenced by information that will never reach 
the trial stage and rely on police reports that often include the police 
officers’ perceptions and considerations about a specific crime.  
 
Sometimes an official report is not even necessary and there are informal 
communications between prosecutors and the police that then lead to an 
investigation. When prosecutors deal with cases they participate in the 
investigation and interact with the police- and so -to some extent- have to 
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recognize what are priorities for them (Montana, 2009). One prosecutor 
gave this as an example:  
“The police tell me the cases which look particularly serious […] For 
example, I recently had a case of robbers operating in a small 
village […] These are bullies who have crossed the line: they go to 
bars and they do not pay, they require their families to give them 
money, they blackmail friends and acquaintances and they become 
violent etc. This case was indicated to me by the chief of the police 
in that village. So, in three days, I have to say that I had no other 
urgent matters, I prepared the documents applying [to the judge] for 
pre-trial custody and the judge decided [agreed with the request] in 
15 days […] Anyway, I have to say that, in general, I always 
intervene when the police report to me that a case is serious.”  
 
The role of prosecutors as intermediaries between the police and the 
courts means that they see much that is prejudicial, irrelevant or partially 
irrelevant and emotionally charged. The overall goal of the criminal justice 
process is to render the judge impartial, not the prosecutor. Judges, by 
contrast, only evaluate the evidence. Although, in Italy, they can still order 
new investigations, they do not actually direct the police or directly carry 
out investigation activities. So, compared to judges, prosecutors search for 
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the truth under different conditions. Some admit this. Five prosecutors 
emphasized in various words that the judges “cannot see very much”. 
Judges do not understand the practical difficulties of carrying out an 
investigation and they only have a partial idea of the factual scenario. This 
is partially connected to the difficulties created by the ambiguous legal 
rules that shape prosecutors’ and police’s investigative powers, not to 
mention the backlog of cases and the financial and organizational 
problems. But there is another reason. Prosecutors have a different 
knowledge of the case because they have a different and more direct 
contact with the social reality in which a crime has been perpetrated.  
 
The various types of information that prosecutors collect and receive 
during the investigation contribute to create their own image of a crime. 
Their close contact with social reality reduces the degree of “detachment” 
that, in prosecutors’ view, judicial culture guarantees. They present 
evidence to the judge to convince him or her that their interpretation of 
events is correct: they are thus functionally a party to proceedings. In the 
end, the prosecutors’ search for the truth takes place in a different context: 
that of an awareness of a wider-range of information, some of it illegally or 
unfairly obtained, some of it prejudicial or emotionally charged but not 
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formally legally relevant or of doubtful or limited relevance, most of it 
untested by informed dialogue between parties. 
 
Nonetheless, these functional differences do not seem to affect 
prosecutors’ image of themselves as quasi-judges. On the one hand 
prosecutors try to assess and increase the possibilities to obtain a 
conviction for utilitarian reasons - because it is a waste of time to put 
cases before judges to have them rejected. They have to evaluate the 
evidence with enough judicial distance to anticipate a judge’s reaction. As 
one prosecutor explained (but many others concurred): “So, in general, 
when I decide to begin a prosecution, I try to think like a judge and to 
decide according to the evidence that the judge will probably have. This is 
because it is useless to begin a prosecution which will end with an 
acquittal […] I always try to foresee what can happen.” But Italian 
prosecutors go beyond this in claiming to have a similar duty of neutrality 
and impartiality to judge. They value due process and legal values in 
themselves and place more faith in criminal procedure than administrative 
fact-finding. 
 
Even in common law regimes public prosecutors in theory are required to 
do more than partisanly present the prosecution case before the court 
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(Jackson, 2004, p. 112). But, for Italian prosecutors, impartiality is what 
defines their cultural proximity to judges. Despite the 1989 reform, 
prosecutors still act in some ways as if they were fulfilling the role of 
examining magistrates in the inquisitorial tradition. As three of the 
interviewees saw it, the “prosecutors’ aim is to transfer as many 
documents as possible from their dossier to the judge’s dossier.” This 
emphasis on prosecutors’ sense of themselves as guardians of the law, 
their independence and discretionary powers help to distance prosecutors 
from the pressure of political and popular definitions of the crime problem. 
 
PROSECUTORS 'RESISTANCE' TO THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Over the last 15 years different governments have taken a number of 
steps to tackle street crime and illegal immigration and reassure the public 
that they are protecting their security. Arguably, the most draconian of the 
measures taken to tackle illegal immigration is the Bossi-Fini Act was 
passed in 2002 by the then center-right government. It sets out that a non-
Italian national who does not comply with a deportation order shall be 
arrested and immediately sent for trial. In these cases the punishments 
range from a minimum of six months to a maximum of four years 
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imprisonment, excluding mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances. In 
theory, prosecutors cannot postpone dealing with these cases. The code 
of criminal procedure requires that the prosecutor is immediately informed 
when an arrest has been carried out by the police. The Prosecutor then 
has to review the arrest procedure in order to decide if the arrested 
person(s) must be set free immediately or the arrest is lawful. 
 
If the arrest is validated the Bossi-Fini Act  requires the trial thus follows a 
procedure called direttissima, that circumvents the need for a preliminary 
hearing. For the vast majority of the crimes a trial needs to be held before 
the preliminary hearing judge to determine if there is a case that needs be 
referred to the judge. At this stage new investigations can be ordered, or 
the case sent on to trial. The direttissima trial by contrast, has to take 
place within forty-eight hours of the arrest before the same judge who also 
decides if the arrest is lawful or not. As a result, prosecutors have no 
choice, they must deal with the Bossi-Fini cases immediately. Arguably, 
such legislation aims to circumvent the 'legality' principle by which the 
executive has no legal power to impose priorities to prosecutors. The 
Bossi-Fini Act tries to force the criminal justice system to treat immigration 
as a priority. This is because as the minister of justice at the time 




The reality of what prosecutors do, however, is often quite different. The 
Prosecutors interviewed insisted that that they do not consider these 
crimes as high priorities. In particular, when it comes to the Bossi-Fini Act, 
prosecutors admit that they are not interested in investigating illegal 
immigration unless they can spot a link with organized crime. The 
relatively low priority is clearly illustrated by the way prosecutors deal with 
incarceration of accused persons and sentences. In general, one of the 
criteria prosecutors take into consideration to request pre-trial custody is 
recidivism. But this does not seem to be relevant when it is only linked with 
violation of a deportation order under the Bossi-Fini Act. The consequence 
is that prosecutors never ask for pre-trial custody, unless the accused 
person(s) has committed other crimes. Moreover, during trials, 
prosecutors are not interested in asking for a severe punishment. If the 
crime is only related to the Bossi-Fini Act, illegal immigrants are arrested 
and, normally, sentenced to a few months of imprisonment (some said 
three months, others six), but the sentence will be suspended. In practice, 
this means that illegal immigrants will be set free and, given that they 
normally have neither documents nor any official residence in Italy, they 




This lack of prioritization may be further illustrated by the way medium or 
large prosecution offices use specialized units of prosecutors who only 
deal with certain categories of crime. Such units are created to tackle in a 
more structured way crimes that are considered more serious and/or more 
difficult to investigate. In practice, these units increase co-ordination 
between prosecutors that, in this way, have a better understanding of the 
crime problem in the geographical area where they work. None of the 
prosecution offices included in this study had a unit dealing with illegal 
immigration -or for that matter street crime, though they were found to be 
dealing with environmental, organized, corruption and white-collar crimes. 
 
That the Bossi-Fini Act has so far failed to impose its priorities on 
prosecutors becomes even clearer if examining the conditions that the law 
imposes on the arrest and prosecution of illegal immigrants. Article five ter 
states that the crime is committed when the immigrant remains in Italy 
without having a ‘reasonable reason’ to do so. If there is such a reason, 
prosecutors can set the arrested person(s) free. Prosecutors interpret this 
concept in a wide variety of ways. One interviewee explained that only a 
pregnant woman has a reason to remain in Italy. But another argued that 
the accused person‘s financial situation must be carefully checked to 
understand if they have enough money to leave the country and one 
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young prosecutor said that every immigrant who does not have a real 
home has a justification not to leave, because he or she cannot possibly 
afford it! 
 
It could be argued that what we have here is further evidence of socio-
political considerations influencing prosecutors' definition of the crime 
problem. But this desire to distance themselves from political or public 
definitions does not only concern illegal immigration: it is linked to any 
crime policy indication that prosecutors perceive to be influenced by 
emotional and populist 'moral panics' (Cohen, 1972). Although this term as 
such is not used by the media, politicians, public or prosecutors, an 
expression that comes near to it that is used is allarme sociale. Allarme 
sociale literally means social alarm and defines the reaction (often 
disproportionate) that society has to certain crimes and/or certain 
perpetrators or victims. This reaction may be targeted against a particular 
group of people, like immigrants, but can also be spontaneous and linked 
to moral and political issues. Crime of course is not the only source of 
social alarm; disorder and incivilities can also influence the public 




Italian prosecutors are well aware of public perceptions about the 
connection between street crime and illegal immigration. But they assume 
that allarme sociale over these matters is in large part a result of media 
exploitation of public fears. Prosecutors have their own conception of the 
sort of allarme sociale that merits inclusion in their priorities for 
prosecution. According to the interviewees, these are crimes that are 
particularly dangerous, that jeopardize people’s sense of security in going 
about their everyday life, that involve certain kinds of victims (e.g. women, 
children and elderly people) and, in general, that have a great impact on 
the society. Allarme sociale counts only if it is linked with “the objective 
seriousness of the case.”  
 
In general, the more the legal punishment is severe, the more the crime is 
serious. Crimes which threaten life are more important than crimes which 
threaten property. Finally, the damage suffered by the victim can be a 
relevant parameter as well. These are some of the ‘objective’ criteria that 
determine if a crime is serious and, as a consequence, if it has caused 
social alarm. Deliberately leaving a case on one side and allowing a case 
to fall into prescrizione can have consequences for a prosecutors’ career 
and can involve ministerial and CSM disciplinary hearings. Nonetheless 
there are ways around this. As one prosecutor said: “The legality principle 
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is a false problem. There are many ways not to apply it. Then you can say 
you are sorry, there will be disciplinary proceedings, but how do they 
prove this was intentional? You just made a mistake.” 
  
Italian prosecutors accept that they have a responsibility to assuage public 
fears, but, at the same time, they believe they have to decide if the 
supposed crime problem is commensurate with its level of social alarm. As 
one of the lawyers interviewed put it, allarme sociale is a volatile concept 
that evokes different images for the public and for prosecutors. 
Prosecutors compare these two images and filter these external 
influences, which do not disappear, but they are substantially moderated 
by other internal considerations. The public perception of social alarm is 
not sufficient to determine priorities. Prosecutors depict the criteria they 
use as purely legal and objective but, in practice, they are also subjective 
and intertwined with socio-political considerations about the problem of 
crime. The clearest example is the Bossi-Fini Act, which, in theory, is 
punished strictly but which has a low priority for them.  
 
On the other hand, there is a limit to such 'resistance.' Prosecutors admit, 
as we have seen, that they are inevitably influenced in choosing what to 
investigate by the crimes that the police report to them. If the police decide 
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to carry out a particular operation prosecutors have to deal with the legal 
consequences that this creates (e.g. a large number of arrested persons). 
Because the police have the right to arrest, this triggers a procedure that 
binds prosecutors. One of the prosecutor interviewed explained that: “for 
arrested persons caught red handed, it depends whether the police decide 
to focus on areas where there is drug trafficking or prostitution or where 
there are illegal immigrants. This is how it works.”  
 
The police for their part follow directives on anti-crime policies that come 
to them from their organizations at the top of which are the Minister of 
Interior and the Ministry of Defense. Thus, although the government 
cannot directly influence prosecutors because the legality principle 
prevents the government from determining any sort of prosecutorial 
priority, they do have an indirect impact on the prosecutors’ job. 
Prosecutors do not have any real opportunity to discuss the directives or 
co-ordinate their priorities with police priorities. The importance of police 
decisions at this stage of the criminal proceedings is heightened by the 
fact that police officers are evaluated on the basis of quantitative 
indicators. Amongst the parameters used to make statistical evaluations 
are arrests, deportations, denunciations and the controls police perform on 
persons and vehicles. As a result, street crime and illegal immigration 
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cases make up between fifty percent and seventy percent of the crimes 
that prosecutors process. 
 
This places a high burden on the criminal justice system not only because 
of their number but because prosecutors must always discover the official 
and fixed residence of all the accused persons so as to deliver the 
necessary legal notifications during the investigation phase. When 
immigrants are involved this is difficult because often the residence cannot 
be found. Prosecutors admit that even if street crime and illegal 
immigration are more priorities for the police than for them they cannot 
easily stop the constant stream of street crime and illegal immigration 
cases. And the number of immigrants in prison has increased dramatically. 
 
But we nonetheless disagree with those academic commentators who 
argue that this means that prosecutors have come to share public 
concerns about law and order and common sense notions about crime, 
such as stereotypes of immigrants as criminals (Sarzotti, 2006a; Faiella et 
al., 2005; Quassoli, 1999). Instead, it may be true at the level of heads of 
prosecution offices who, in their 'political' role as court spokespersons, 
have to echo political and public concerns. But this does necessarily affect 
the views of single prosecutors. Due account, therefore, should also be 
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taken of the way prosecutors try to minimize the impact of moral panics 
reflected in legislation such as the Bossi-Fini Act.  
 
As far as initiating investigations is concerned, there may not be very 
much prosecutors can do. But as the criminal proceedings go on, 
prosecutors can decide how and where to commit resources during the 
investigation. A Bossi-Fini case or any form of street crime that did not 
actually cause serious consequences (e.g. injuries) will rarely be given a 
detailed investigation. In practice, prosecutors do not see illegal 
immigration (and even less serious street crimes) as ‘problems’ that 
deserve to be tackled aggressively. Prosecutors seek to preserve the 
criminal justice system from interference that would stop what they 
consider more serious crimes from being prosecuted and punished. As in 
many other continental European countries, Italian prosecutors’ see 
themselves as the experts responsible for defining the priorities of the 
criminal justice system. As a consequence, they try hard to maintain a 
cultural distance from different forms of external pressure from victims, 
communities, or politicians, including legislation such as the Bossi-Fini Act. 
Legal filtering is not confined to the construction of cases that will stand 
scrutiny at trial. It also may be seen as filtering out certain forms of political 





This account of how Italian prosecutors respond to moral panics over 
immigrant crime has shown how legal actors can maintain some 
separation from dominant political cultures and dominant legal cultures. 
This form of resistance stems to a large extent from prosecutors’ way of 
thinking of their role. Independence, the legality principle and cultural 
proximity with judges are the bricks in the wall that prosecutors have 
constructed to protect their sense of their own neutrality. Prosecutors 
certainly also have their own political views about the prosecution (or 
persecution) of illegal immigrants. But, they do not all think the same way. 
The findings in this chapter suggest that it is the prosecutors’ role in 
defining substantive priorities that determines their reaction towards this 
crime problem- political disagreement is more a consequence than a 
cause.  
 
Despite the 1989 reform of criminal procedure, prosecutors are reluctant 
to move to an accusatorial conception of their role. They are still attached 
culturally to the idea of their role as neutral and impartial. Abandoning this 
conception would also diminish their credibility when they prosecute in 
political sensitive cases. Various socio-legal conditions have favored this 
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outcome. Prosecutors’ independence is well established in the constitution 
and, though increasingly under political threat, this provides at least formal 
protection for prosecutors from suspicions or allegations of prosecuting a 
case for reasons other than the purely legal. Italian prosecutors are not in 
a position to halt the evolution (or involution) of contemporary criminal 
justice. But they certainly try to balance external pressures by mediating, 
and not simply executing, anti-crime policies that seek to reassure (or 
excite) public opinion.  
 
On the other hand, a number of issues remain very much still to be 
clarified. Most important for present purposes, there is insufficient 
evidence available to show the actual consequences of current 
prosecutors’ resistance to the campaign to prioritize crimes of illegal 
immigrants. There is an acute shortage in Italy of reliable statistical 
information on the functioning of criminal justice agencies that goes 
beyond records of what kinds of crimes are referred by the police or seen 
by the courts. Though it would be easy to show that there has been a 
large increase in the processing of illegal immigrants, it would be tricky to 
say how much higher this could have gone under different circumstances. 
The research described in this chapter is limited to interviews with 
prosecutors, although it was supplemented with interviews with others 
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involved in the criminal process, such as lawyers and police. To engage 
with the 'counterfactual' - of what would have happened if prosecutors 
indeed had changed their priorities in line with governmental indications- 
we would need to have examined a large number of case files over time 
and see what happened to them. Certainly, giving a low priority to such 
cases should mean that the cases that prosecutors put forward are less 
strong than they might otherwise be. In addition de facto many cases will 
not make it through the system in time. On the other hand, relative 
unwillingness to invest time in such matters may also result in such cases 
going to court quickly and thus not risking prescription- exactly as the 
governmental legislation intended.  
 
It is also difficult to predict the future. Prosecutors' dislike of the Bossi-Fini 
law may be seen as over- determined- and it is not certain how they would 
react to other kinds of cases. Many have objections to the way 
governments have chosen to try and condition their actions on this 
substantive issue, for example including the high penalties that have been 
attached to the status crime of being an illegal immigrant so as to make it 
an arrestable offence for which offenders can be kept in custody before 
trial. But they also disagree in principle with any interference with their 
autonomy. We also do not know how much what we are describing is a 
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result of the recency of the 1989 reform and the persistence of the earlier 
inquisitorial legal culture. Certainly changes in their institutional role, as 
proposed by center- right governments in particular, intended to separate 
their role from that of judges and bring it more into line with the 
accusatorial architecture of the 1989 reform, would make such resistance 
more difficult. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
 
1. What are the actual consequences of current prosecutors’ 
resistance to the campaign to prioritize crimes of illegal immigrants? 
 
2. Why do they give lower priority to the crime of being an illegal 
immigrant? 
 
3. There is an acute shortage in Italy of reliable statistical information 
on the functioning of criminal justice agencies that goes beyond 
records of what kinds of crimes are referred by the police or seen 
by the courts. What data should be collected to reliably 
demonstrate that the processing of illegal immigrants has increased 
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at a greater or lesser rate because of the attitudes of the 
prosecutors? 
 
4. What are the differences between the way that Italian prosecutors 
and those in common law systems see their role?  How does it 
affect prosecution of immigrants? 
 
5. What influence should political direction or public concern over the 
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Tillers (ed.) Crime, Procedure and Evidence in Comparative and 
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(Oxford and Portland: Hart, 2008), 81-99. 
 
4
 This legal concept indicates that prosecutors and courts have a time limit 
to bring an accusation to closure. This is not fixed but depends on the 
crime that has been committed (the more the crime is serious, the more 
time is allowed. If cases do not make it in time the accused is not formally 
innocent (sometimes they are clearly guilty) but cannot be prosecuted 
and/or tried further for that crime. 
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